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Uriagereka: A Note on Development Syntax

A NOTE ON DEVELOPMENTAL SYNTAX
JUAN URIAGEREKA
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK
Let me set aside some issues I will not deal
with.
First, I will have nothing to say about whether
the methodology of the experiments discussed in this
conference is sound.
I am not a psycholinguist, others
have already commented on this, and in any case I am
more interested in discussing the syntactic
consequences of the findings, assuming they are real.
Second, I will not discuss specific works in any
detail.
I do have technical comments to mostly all of
them, but these I believe would interest the authors
more than a general audience; in any case our theories
at this point are wide enough either for the
experiments to adapt to my technicalities or, if the
experiments are proven correct, for the syntactic
theories to adapt to their lower-scale consequences.
Finally, although I will admit variation in technical
implementation of theories, I will not admit giving up
the central hypothesis of a system of principles and
parameters that all of us in the conference, I think,
assume uncontroversially.
It is in light of this basic
hypothesis that I want to evaluate developmental claims
of the sort made here.
What does it mean for knowledge of language to
be different from a stage I of infants' development to
a stage k that we may call 'adult'? If our central
hypothesis is correct, this must mean that either a
change in the system of principles, or a change in the
system of parameters, or both, must be allowed to
329
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happen from I to k. Needless to say, there are lowerlevel changes that range from the acquisition of
vocabulary items to the mastery of language idioms and
cliches that do not fall into the previous categories,
at least not obviously. But as is commonly assumed, it
is not clear that linguistics has anything interesting
to say about the specifics of each of these cases, at
least from the point of view of knowledge of language.
A general theory of learning, in a strict sense now (as
opposed to the 'learning' notion that we need, usually
compared to growing) may be interested in these
processes. Nevertheless, I will return in the end to
one specific issue related to this matter.
Let us then concentrate on the acquisition of
general properties of language. Consider first the
issue of principles. These come genetically specified,
which of course does not necessarily mean they do not
develop.
In principle, there could be several reasons
for development to take place.
First, it could be that
the linguistic system is laid out that way.
I will not
explore this here, mainly because I don't know how to.
Second, it could be that something in the (extra
linguistic) cognitive systems affects the sequence of
acquisition of the linguistic one. In this instance,
two typical situations emerge: either stimulus
independent maturation of the relevant cognitive
domains, or changes propitiated by triggering input of
different sorts, which may be available to the learner
at different stages. However, the assumption that
input data is not organized already discards the second
of these possibilities. Even when it appears that the
cause for a maturational change is the data in
question, what is at issue is not the data, but the
nature of the mind which is not capable (at a given
stage) of processing these data.
In practice, we use working hypotheses of the
sort:
"access to principles is instantaneous and/or
global, etc." I will assume that, more than just
working hypotheses, these are the ones which make fewer
assumptions about the language system.
It seems to me
complicated enough to design the language system for it
to be sensitive to cognitive restrictions of the sort
sketched above. At any rate, I will try to show that
some of these adjustments are sound. To be precise,
some of the papers of this conference in fact could be
interpreted as presenting a challenge to the
330
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instantaneous acquisition view--for instance, those
offering arguments that some principles, such as
statements making reference to functional categories,
come to be available at a time /' considerably later
than the time / when principles making reference to
lexical categories are available. I will try to show,
however, that under a plausible interpretation of these
results the instantaneous acquisition (null) hypothesis
may be kept.
I don't know whether this is good or bad;
but I do know that the other option needs further
justification and evidence, and it is not clear to me
that it is necessarily invoked.
Consider first what maturation's affecting the
system of principles entails:
(a) The developmental
process in question must be universal; (b) the child at
time / must not be able to do things that s/he does at
time 1'. This may seem trivial; I don't think it is:
(a) entails that all of the observations having to do
with processes of this sort changing from language to
language (Le., when the interval from / to /' is not
constant across languages) have to be explained in
terms of a further variable, which I will return to;
(b) in turn entails not only that children are going to
say different things at / and /', but also, crucially,
that they are going to mean different things.
Let me first explore (b). There is an old
controversy about whether the mapping between the
syntax and the semantics is transparent.
I happen to
believe that it is not; but even those of us that
advocate strongly for the autonomy of syntax do want to
have some fairly simple mapping between this and the
semantics. If something is uncontroversial about this
mapping it is that meaning is somehow compositional. A
version of this within current standards is the Full
Interpretation Principle (FIP). What FIP entails for
LF is that everything that feeds this level is
interpretable. We may even strengthen this to claiming
that LF is interpreted in terms of everything that
feeds LF (and only that). At any rate, nobody will
deny that functional elements such as INFLECTION or
DETERMINER have a rather precise use at LF in adult
grammars. Here is the quandary then: if the child does
not have these at time /, how does s/he express ideas
that presuppose them?
One possible answer is, of course, tIs/he
doesn't." This has to be evaluated carefully, though,
because functional elements are quite central to the
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construction of many of our meaningful expressions.
Thus, one may conceive that children do not have access
to tense specifications or specificity restrictions;
but that is not all we use functional elements for.
Take any verb, and two parts within it are going to be
clear: one, expressing a specific predicate,
idiosyncratic to that verb; another one, expressing an
arrangement of argument variables common to other
verbs. The latter has been argued to be a functional
element, as seems natural (there's a small, fixed set
of these; they themselves do not contribute to lexical
meaning, etc.). In fact, these days a tendency exists
again to decompose even lexical items into more
fundamental units, some of which (causative morphemes
and the like) arguably fit into the functional
paradigm.
If the distinction lexical/functional is going
to make any sense (and it does seem to make good
empirical predictions), it is going to fall, most
likely, into one of two possibilities:
(i) lexical
elements are exclusively representing matters of
predicate logic, matters of higher order logics being
reserved for functional elements; (ii) lexical elements
are lexicon entries with predicative import, functional
elements being 'the rest'. It is easy to see that
hypothesis (a) leaves the child at time I in the case
in point as having only predicative structure.
Furthermore, given that virtually all words (at least
in a large sub-set of languages) contain both lexical
and functional sub-parts, the child would be
learning/using lexical items which do not correspond to
adult lexical items--in fact contain only a subset of
the specifications of the latter. Hypothesis (b), on
the other hand, allows the child to learn certain
complex units, so long as these are lexicon units. It
predicts, however, that those words which are
syntactically decomposable into (D-structure) elements
coming directly from the lexicon are not going to be
learned/used if they contain a functional part. These,
in most languages, are far from exotic.'

1.
A typical example is causative elements in Basque, Japanese,
etc.
The relevant words have the import of "cause-V", with
essentially any verb being attached to the causative morpheme. The
child should not be able to learn these words if the morpheme is
functional and sjhe doesn't have access to functional elements.
Crucially, these elements are different from non-productive forms
which have the causality as part of their lexical meaning (e.g.,
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The issue of ontogenesis is crucial within the
approach I am taking (given that I do not want to
ascribe the developmental process directly to
properties of the language system). Hypothesis (a)
above leads us into the direction of a computational
speculation. One may suggest that, for whatever
specific reason, the relations encoded by functional
structure are harder to construct than the relations
encoded by lexical structure--thus the former come in
later, together intuitively with the maturation of
other 'pseudo-mathematical' capacities. On the other
hand, the other plausible approach to the hypothetical
problem is that input lexical units are more 'visible'
than functional ones--which we know is true even in the
adult grammar. As has been proposed in the literature,
it is not inconceivable that the child simply does not
identify functional elements. Assuming that this
triggering experience is necessary for the child to
realize that such elements exist, not hearing these
elements would result in not being able to use them. 2
This type of approach would be more in line with
hypothesis (b) above, in as much as the morphological
weight of functional elements appears to be languagespecific. Since this hypothesis entails differences in
the lexical/functional distinction that are not
universal, I will deal with it below when I turn to
parametric matters.

"worry" arguably contains a causative element as part of its
meaning). The latter, the child should be able to learn, assuming
these are indeed lexical elements under the hypothesis in question.
2.
Note incidentally that the latter assumption is far from
trivial. On the one hand, we have to worry about languages where
functional elements are not specified morphologically, hence are
never audible. On the other, we have to worry about languages where
functional elements enter virtually into all words, morphologically-the reverse instance. It does not seem to be the case that, in
these languages, children drop those elements, like they appear to
do in languages where the morphological presence of functional
elements is sporadic. This difficulty is in line with the observed
fact that, in some languages, processes of the sort of Verb-movement
come in very early--thus, apparently Verb second appears virtually
from scratch in German, though not in English.
Assuming that
movements of this sort presuppose the presence of functional
categories (to serve as landing sites), this kind of evidence
strongly suggests that the whole initial claim about functional
elements must be framed in terms of the parameter system, and not
the system of principles. For the sake of argument, though, I will
proceed ignoring this sort of evidence.
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Let us consider, then, whether a child without
functional elements can communicate anything within
hypothesis (a). Consider (1) below:
(1) Sonnets are formal and meaningful
i. Ax Sex) --> F(X) and M(x)
ii. EE{S(x)} E = F(x) + M(x)
(1) is ambiguous. Under reading (i), (1) means that if
something is a sonnet, it is formal and meaningful.
Actually, I think the statement should be weaker; in
particular, it is not clear that it is falsified if one
sonnet, say, is not meaningful, a general property of
generic statements--but I'll return to this shortly.
Under reading (ii), (1) means that there is a partition
in the set of sonnets, E{S(x)}, whereby these are
divided into those which are formal and those which are
meaningful. 3
Now, compare (1) to (2):
(2) Successful fOrmal and meaningful sonnet writer
In this expression I don't think that a (ii)-type
reading is available. That "Shakespeare was a
successful formal and meaningful sonnet writer" means
that he wrote successfully sonnets which were both
formal and meaningful--not that he wrote two types of
sonnets. One of the properties of incorporation is
that it appears to be restricted in terms of the
functional/lexical distinction. Only functional
elements incorporate to functional elements; only
lexical elements incorporate to lexical elements. This
means that whereas "sonnet", as used in (1), can be
represented as "sonnet (x)" (not just logically, but
also syntactically, with the variable being mapped from
a functional element), "sonnet" as used in (2) cannot
contain a functional part, therefore, by hypothesis,
not a variable. In general, we do not appear to need
variables for instances of noun incorporation; thus, we
can call Jones "a partridge hunter" even if he has
never hunted partridges. 4 "Partridge hunter" can be

3.
This reading is highlighted in an example like "Americans are
black and white".
4.
The difference in question can be seen perhaps more clearly in
(i):
(i) a. Jones hunts partridges
b. Jones hunts partridge
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seen as a complex predicate, where "partridge"
specifies the type of predicate "hunter" is, but does
not invoke actual partridges. From this point of view,
the reason why reading (ii) is lost in (2) is that this
reading invokes a set-theoretic operation, one which is
not available if to begin with we do not have a way of
constructing a set "sonnet (x)" there.
This is not a traditional or even a standard
view, but it has been explored in the last few years
and I want to pursue it for the sake of argument. In
general, elements like "sonnets" in (1) are analyzed
set-theoretically: "the set of sonnets". But suppose
there is a simpler way in which "sonnets"--or I should
say, more precisely, "sonnet"--is interpretable. Think
of an "ur" concept for the kind SONNET, which is a
rigid designator (invariable across possible worlds).5
One can think of names just this way: Jones may be
represented as "Jones" (j), where i is not a variable
but a constant index.
(Literally, what Jones would
mean is "that entity i labeled "Jones".) Let me call
this the naming operation.
(Of course, we can treat
names set-theoretically. From this point of view, the

The intuitive meaning of (ia) is that Jones hunts individuals
belonging to the kind "partridges". In contrast, the intuitive
meaning of (ib) is that Jones engages in an sub-case of the activity
of hunting; namely, "partridge hunting". (The latter plausibly
involves incorporation of "partridge" to "hunts", perhaps at LF- -for
some unclear reason, English, unlike other languages, does not allow
verbs of the [N[V]] type at S-structure.) The object in the second
instance cannot control into a secondary resultative predicate:
(ii) a. [Jones [[hunts partridges i ] [PRO i dead]]]
b. *[Jones [[hunts partridgei ] [PRO i dead]]]
Assuming an analysis of the (b) instances in terms of incorporation,
it is not clear why the trace of "partridge" cannot control PRO-syntactically, that is. This follows, though, if partridges are not
invoked extensionally in these instances- -not having reference,
"partridge" cannot control PRO.
5.
Actually,"it has been argued that only natural kinds (like,
say, "gold") are rigid designators, nominal kinds (like "bachelor")
being amenable to a more traditional view that has elements of this
sort be non-rigid. Presumably, "sonnet" is also a nominal kind. If
the reader is thus unsatisfied with the argument, the example can be
changed to "particles are weighable and measurable" (incidentally,
a false statement at least on one interpretation), and "reliable
weighable and measurable particle accelerator". I don't think
there's a sense in which particle is a nominal kind--although this
is debatable.
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universe could be divided into those entities to which
the predicate Jones applies (a singleton set, let us
say), and those which do not satisfy said predicate
(all other entities in the universe).
I am assuming,
however, that this set-theoretic distinction is not
invoked by way of the naming operation. 6 It is not
inconceivable that we can think of entities like
sonnets in two ways: as members of the set of what we
call sonnets, and as a conceptual unit labeled
"sonnet", a kind. This would allow us to get a (i)type reading for example (2), even if by hypothesis no
variable--and hence no set--is at stake. To calculate
the meaning of the expression, we need to further name
the simple "sonnet" (j) as "formal-and-meaningful"
("sonnet" (j». Adjectival operations of this sort
could be treated by allowing recursive embedding of the
naming operation. 7
A further consequence of the availability of
this reading is that there should be a meaning for (1)
where the sUbject does not denote the set of sonnets-but rather a prototypical entity which is named
"sonnet" (j).
(In the relevant literature, kinds are
specifically argued to be akin to names.)
In that kind
reading, there is no entailment that all sonnets must
be formal and meaningful, which as I said seems
correct. This is important because the relevant
reading is generic, thus cannot be expressed in terms
of the existential operator.
Intuitively, if the
subject were introduced by an existential, it would be
true to say "sonnets are formal and meaningful" even if
there is only one sonnet which is formal and
meaningful--all the rest not being so. This does not
seem to be an interpretation for this sentence, though.
The point is that the relevant interpretation makes no
reference to the existing sonnets, but simply to the
basic concept SONNET, as mentioned also in expressions
of the sort "the sonnet is formal and meaningful".
If
a given sonnet does not conform to this description, it
will deviate in whatever sense from the prototypical
concept--but will not render the statement false

6.
In fact, arguments have been provided that treating names as
descriptions yields the wrong semantic import. I think there are
fairly good reasons to be able (at least) to treat names as
descriptions. However, for my argument to go through, all we need is
that names need not be descriptors, but can be rigid designators.
7.
This is most likely needed independently in expressions like
John Smith, arguably of the form "John" ("Smith" (j».
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because set membership was not at issue to begin with.
In contrast, if only one sonnet is formal and
meaningful, and the rest are not, we cannot give said
properties to the prototypical sonnet, however it is
that we come up with this notion (not set-theoretically
if these ideas are correct).8 All of this is to say
that there are ways in which one can compute (some)
meaning without access to, in this instance, variables.
Under the assumption that these correlate with
functional structure, we have in effect provided a
mechanism to compute some expressions without
functional structure. It doesn't take much thought to
see, however, that the kinds of things we are going to
be able to compute this way is rather limited. In
essence, we will be able to name identified entities,
and stack further names onto these named entities.
Note the presupposition for this view is that
prototypical "ur" concepts can be grasped rather
freely, and can be added amongst them and applied to
individuated entities by way of the naming labeling. 9
It is not trivial how exactly these additions,
particularly of predicates (e.g. "formal and
meaningful"), are going to proceed, especially after we

8.
Another typical instance where a kind reading ensues, and in
fact no other reading as far as I can see, is what traditionally
have been called 'impersonal constructions':
(i) a. Man spricht hier Deutsch
b. Ici on parle Francais
c. Aqui se habla Espanol
It is rather unfortunate that these expressions are called
impersonal, for they must necessarily invoke a human subject. At
any rate, in each case the human kind here (wherever that might be)
is said to speak such-and-such a language. This is true even if
some individuals do not. (It is possible that the ~ and Qll (from
the Latin homo 'man') markers that we see in these examples mean
literally that, 'man'--in line with their etymology. In that case,
we could represent the reading in question as "man"(i) , with the
usual sexist overtones ... ) Crucially, a partition reading is
impossible in instances like (ii):
(ii) a. Man spricht hier Deutsch und Swahili
b. Ici on parle Francais et Swahili
c. Aqui se habla Espanol y Swahili
Suppose that "here" is some country. What these sentences mean is
that (prototypical) humans in this country speak both languages at
issue, not that they divide in those who speak one or the other.
9.
Semantics of the sort exploring cognitive primitives (such as
"human" and "cause") could in principle provide an answer to this
matter.
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have devoided ourselves from set-theory, and hence
functions. But one can imagine ways around this; for
instance, that fuzzy concepts can be created for kinds
which contain some properties of each of the added
predicates, not necessarily all. 10
In sum, the conceptual consequences of this move
are vast. Some of these are maybe correct, and have
been discussed. To invoke a deliberately provocative
example--which as far as I know has not been mentioned
in the relevant literature--recall experiments on
dolphin communication. The ones I am vaguely familiar
with had these animals being able to understand the
equivalent of "red ball" or "small ball", but by no
means the equivalent of "no ball" or "three balls".
One can conjecture that although these mammals have
somehow access to (some sort) of meaning computation of
the sort outlined, they surely do not have access to
set-theoretic computations. 11 To pursue the
speculation, one wonders whether the genetic mutation
that gave humans language is related to the quantum

10.
Needless to say, the consequences of this go way beyond the
scope of this note. Personally, I am of the belief that the way
humans conceptualize, say, "water" has nothing to do with a
(realistic) definition of this concept, but rather with (fuzzy)
bundles of properties that concern humans. That, of course, is hard
to establish--nevertheless is intuitively rather clear. For me to
call something "water", I am going to worry about whether it is
something tangible, it tastes/smells/looks in such-and-such a way,
and so on, rather than about whether it has this or the other atomic
structure, or whatever other analytic approach of the sort that
worries philosophers.
11.
Apparently, dolphins could also understand "every ball". It
is not clear to me,
though,
that this is necessarily a
quantificational reading.
It could well be that the animal
understands, say, "bring ball", and keeps bringing these objects
until there's nothing else to bring.
I don't know whether the
experiments were careful enough to test this.
One can imagine,
also, that these animals could get some form of "some ball", by
interpreting "bring ball" as a command to bring something which is
a ball. However, the minute one goes to generalized quantifiers,
such as "many balls", or "most balls", or any numerals, problems
would immediately arise if no set theory is available. I would like
to know, finally, whether dolphins and so on can compute expressions
like "red small ball", and if so whether they interpret them as "red
and small ball" or as "red [small ball)"; the latter can be tested
by making them interpret "large small ball", which would be
contradictory if one does not have access to a recursive operation.
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leap that entails having access to recursion, with the
possible consequence, at least, of getting set Theory
as a result.
Speculations aside, I went through the trouble
of suggesting a way to compute sheer predicates (by
"sheer" I mean predicates that stand out there as
concepts, not as functions defining sets) to point in
the direction of what I would like to see theories do
that claim that functional elements are not available
to infants: can we then be shown how it is that these
infants compute meaning? If my suggestions are on the
right track, do children, for instance, start by naming
entities, and then associate them to predicates, before
they go into more elaborate constructions?12 And so
on. My very vague knowledge of these matters tells me
that perhaps children do follow a sequence along these
lines, but I won't venture to speculate anything in
this respect. At any rate, it should be obvious that,
under any hypothesis about functional categories that
relates these bijectively to set-theoretic operations,
if the former are missing, the latter should be too.
And it seems to me that this is worth exploring, if
only to falsify either the psycholinguistic or the
syntactic hypothesis or possibly both.
I should say, though, that any radical version
of the syntactic hypothesis just mentioned is bound to
create all sorts of psycholinguistic nightmares. Take
a difficult case. A verb like "frighten" is arguably
represented in L(exical)-C(onceptual) structure as:
CAUSE (x, (BE FEARED (x by y»). Not only are abstract
morphemes and variables needed here, but furthermore
the language learner must find out that two variables
in the LC structure of this predicate are identical
(the cause and the theme refer to the same individual).
What does a child without Set Theory learn when faced
with "frighten"? Does s/he only get a non-causative
reading (available in instances like "unicorns frighten
Bill")? Again, all of this is testable; for instance,
a child without a causative reading for "frighten"
should not be able to interpret "Bill was frightened by
Mary" or "Mary frightened Bill to steal his lunch". In
any case, if things are the way I presented them, then
we would be really talking about maturation in a
rightful sense. Thus the process should appear in all
children roughly around the same age, variation being

12.

Or: Can they interpret "large small ball"? (See fn. 11.)
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possible only within individuals, and not within
language groups. (As I said in fn.2, this seems
unlikely--more importantly, though, it is a falsifiable
claim in rather non-trivial ways.)
A milder version of the lexical/functional
split, hypothesis (b) above, moves us directly into the
issue of Parameter Theory. It is plainly obvious that
different languages have different lexical space for
these distinctions. Where a language like Haitian uses
two verbs to express the event of an exchange of an
object x from a given (not necessarily specified)
location to a location~y caused by an individual z,
English uses the ditransitive "give". Therefore the
set of lexical categories of English in this view is
smaller for this subpart of the language than in
Haitian. The question is then: are Haitian children
slower in picking up the relevant distinctions than
English children are? If they are, then this could be
interesting evidence for the hypothesis in question; I
suspect, though, that matters are a bit more complex,
to which I now turn.
The real issue is whether the set of
hypothesized functional categories (in terms of (a) or
(b) above or any other reasonable hypothesis) coincides
with the set of elements that children allegedly do not
have in a given language. Suppose it doesn't.
However, suppose that the last of these sets in fact is
syntactically definable in a plausible way. In other
words, is a sub-set of the set of functional
categories, such that "so-and-so", where the latter is
some kind of syntactic property. It is conceivable
that "so-and-so" is hard to learn; in fact, typical if
we are dealing with a Subset Principle instance. It
could be thus argued that if "so-and-so" corresponds to
the marked option, it takes longer to learn it if the
necessary input data is exotic or hard to process. As
has often been argued, the former should be irrelevant,
short of allowing the possibility of coming up with
potentially different adult grammars--but the latter,
as has been noted, is possible. (Note also that if the
issue were one of exotic data, maturation would have
nothing to do with the matter.) In this instance, we
may expect variation not just within individuals, but
also within language groups, obviously.
There is one kind of parameter, however, which
cannot have anything to do with developmental matters:
what we may call 'underspecification' parameters.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/16

12

Uriagereka: A Note on Development Syntax

DEVELOPMENTAL SYNTAX

341

These have really no status within UG, but are merely
'shortcuts' that this system takes. Head position is
an example that has been mentioned in this respect. It
is entirely plausible that UG simply has nothing to say
about linearity of heads/complements, and these get
linearized one way or another because of the nature of
PF. 13 Since this type of parameter is not part of UG,
we cannot make reference to it. One cannot grow into
its specifications simply because there is no state to
achieve. At best, some additional process might
obscure access to the arbitrary setting that these
parameters take. This, however, seems highly unlikely
for this kind of parameter. If this were true, there
would be a stage where children, say, have both options
for head position open (there is no unmarked option
that UG provides). In fact, such stages do not seem to
be attested.
There are probably good reasons for that.
I am
assuming here that linguistic structures are, to use a
term with a precise meaning in Physics, 'chiral'. That
is, just like SUb-atomic particles move in one
arbitrary direction, so too heads and dependents must
be fixed in an arbitrary direction--it doesn't matter
which, so long as this 'handedness' is kept throughout
the system. As a matter of fact, I will assume that
'chirality' is a property of any system that entails
(even very abstract) communication, hence not part of
the linguistic system. 14 But if setting this
parameter is so central to the "chirality" of the
system, it simply is unlikely that the necessary
information to set it is hard to process. At any rate,
the situation contrasts drastically with Sub-set
parameters, where not just the parameter, but even the
unmarked option comes specified within UG by the Theory
of Markedness.

13.
There are fairly elaborate studies on the setting of
parameters of the Sub-set type, showing evidence that children start
with the unmarked option, as expected. No evidence, as far as I
know, has ever been presented that 'head-last' or 'head-first' is
the unmarked option. It seems very likely, thus, that neither is,
which is what is predicted if this is a sort of epiphenomeno1ogica1
parameter.
14.
If different sub-atomic particles didn't agree on whether to
move right or left, fields simply couldn't exist; likewise, if two
observers in outer space do not agree on what right and left or up
and down are, they couldn't communicate anything about the universe
they observe.
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In real life, parameters can be extremely
intricate, and can deceive one into thinking that a
maturational issue is at stake. Consider a kind of
parameter that does not get much attention lately, but
was discussed a few years ago: a 'domain specific'
parameter--as opposed to a 'global' one that cuts
across the whole language. 15 Take for instance
clitics/agreement-markers in different languages.
There is a vast range of variation here in terms of
whether a given argument is doubled, and if so whether
it is doubled by agreement (intuitively, a clitic
encoded into the morphology) or by a clitic. Well
known implications emerge. For instance, no language
with object doubling lacks subject doubling; however,
the converse isn't true: there are languages with
subject doubling that lack object doubling.
Furthermore, if the doubling in question is of the
agreement type for the object, then so it must be for
the subject; again, the converse not being true.
Differences are even more subtle than this, with
implications also holding internal to objects, whether
they are direct or indirect, and even internal to
arguments, whether they are pronominal or full.
Suppose that we are talking here about a number n of
variations; for binary parameters, this means we should
get 2 to the nth square variations. In fact we get
much less than that. As is well known, also, we cannot
reduce this number by linking parameters logically,
under the well motivated assumption that these are all
independent.
However, suppose that parameters with the
following format are possible: property P does/not hold
(in domain d), for d a variable ranging over relevant
syntactic domains. And now imagine that two given
values of d are logically linked as a matter of UG.
Take the concrete case I have mentioned. Let it be the
case that internal arguments do not enter into
agreement relations, but externalized arguments may.
Imagine then a language that forces LC THEME arguments
to be externalized in the syntax (say, Basque). This
means that for any argument higher in the Thematic
Hierarchy within this language, said argument must be
externalized. LC restrictions, together with the
parametric option of externalizing a 'low' argument,
have as a logical consequence the externalization of a

15.
This type of parameter can arguably be either of the Subset
or the Underspecification type.
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'higher' argument. The converse, of course, isn't
true. Thus, for instance, for a language that forces LC
BENEFICIARY arguments to be externalized in the syntax
(e.g., Galician), it does not follow that THEME
arguments must be externalized. In effect, there is an
implication that UG introduces once we affect the
structures it generates by a parametric decision.
Crucial for this is that the parameter in question not
be a global one of the sort: "Do/not externalize all
arguments." Such a parameter would be immune to
implications within the argument system in terms of
internal/external specifications. Within this view
nothing about the parameter system is implicational.
Typically, language variation and language
change happens within this sort of parameter. There
are well-known 'cycles' in this. At a given
diachronical stage, language L does not have any marks
of externalization for its arguments in terms of
agreement (like Black English). Dislocation strategies
allow displaced arguments to bind pronouns: "John, Mary
thinks he left". Some of these get to be systematic
even in short distance cases: "John, he left". Some of
the pronouns in these constructions cliticize onto the
verb, becoming obligatory (this is typical in many
English creoles). At a given point, clitics may get
integrated into the morphology of the verb, and an
inflectional variant arises--sometimes as a consequence
of verb movement, which places the pronoun in a suffix
position. Fully inflected verbs, though, are subject
to morpho/phonological changes (like the stress
retraction suffered by Middle English); this may result
in the loss of agreement morphemes. And we are back
were we started. These cycles, in turn, are restricted
by properties of UG, as seen above. Thus, the
prediction is that if a language accepts a verb-object
relation "like-her Mary" it is because it has already
accepted a verb-subject relation "John he-like ••• ".
NOW, consider a language where the adult grammar
says "thou criest" and "thou seest-her Mary", but not
*"thou cry" and *"thou see(st) Mary". Suppose that
children learning this language at stage I have no
access to either clitics or affixes, which is tested
independently of these constructions by them not being
able to say, for instance, "chickens" (they say
*"chicken"), or "John's nice" (they say *"John nice").
Then at time 1', children start getting clitics (they
begin to say "John's nice"), but suppose they do not
still get affixes (they still say *"chicken" with the
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meaning of "chickens"). At /' the following data would
be surprising: they say "thou criest".
In this
hypothetical example, a fair question is: has there
been development from *"cry" to "criest" between / and
I'? At first sight it would seem so: children reach
"criest" without an apparent change in the perceptual
mechanism that would allow them to get "chickens"
correctly.
But another variable may be invoked: There
is a linguistic implication such that if a language has
a direct object clitic, then it must have a subject
clitic. The minute the child realizes s/he has a
direct object clitic, s/he is forced by UG into
positing a subject clitic. The agreement marker is a
version of this.
In a sense, the child could afford
not to 'worry' about affixes corresponding to subject
position until s/he decided to worry about clitics
corresponding to object position.
In as much as these are typical domains of
language variation and change, the child must also be
able to chose 'wrong' parametric options of the adult
Core Grammar and stick to them. Whether the parameters
that allow this are of the Underspecification or the
Subset type is a complex matter I do not want to go
into here. The point is that real life parametric
situations may be extremely deceiving for the issue of
development, in as much as internal properties of the
grammar may force spectacular changes that have nothing
to do with development, at least in intermediate
stages. These are precisely the interesting ones, in
as much as they follow indirectly from triggering
evidence in a different, grammatically related domain.
These matters are more deceiving with Domain specific
parameters than otherwise, for in these, properties are
sequentially connected. That is, for a Global
parameter, one expects a set of changes to happen at
the same time, at the moment the parameter is set.
These can be spectacular also, but they shoUld appear
at the same point, and hence can be seen as a typical
parametric situation. However, with Domain Specific
parameters, first one sees less global changes (so an
immediate parametric approach cannot be taken by the
observer); and second one may see changes in sequence,
which is of course tempting to interpret
developmentally.
In any case, I have suggested that development
could be at stake only when the Theory of Markedness is
involved. To recast the point: the child would be
maturing in the sense that s/he is led into the
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unmarked form because of not being able to perceive the
triggering evidence setting the marked one. One
prediction of this approach is that those domains in
which a developmental issue arises should coincide with
marked parametric settings.
Properties at this level
can be fairly abstract, and we may deceive ourselves
into thinking that a language doesn't have them, simply
because they are not obvious. A case in point is long
distance Wh-movement. Children of English, French, and
Spanish were shown in this conference to be taking a
route for these questions which is clear in German and
other languages, but not apparently in the former.
It
has been proposed, however, that in fact this strategy
is indeed used also by adult grammars, although this is
far from obvious and needs to be argued for. At any
rate, even if arguments to this effect didn't exist,
the fact that the option that children take is possible
in a given language (not necessarily their own) is
enough to begin to sketch an account so long as it is
assumed that the property in question is unmarked.
What should be clear is that if a child does
something which no adult does systematically, then a
parametric account cannot be at stake. This means that
the only other option is for the account to be saying
something about the system of principles, perhaps
interacting with other properties--the latter being
parametric. The matter of the universality of the
phenomenon in question is then at stake, and the less
variation in terms of when it occurs the better for
this approach.
Ideally, the variation should be none;
if it isn't, it must be explained in terms of
consequences of the parametric options taken by a given
language. This would be the clearest instance of a
maturational process. Research in this sense is always
interesting, for it may suggest changes that we
theoreticians need to make in our model of UG, or may
confirm hypotheses which are not otherwise completely
obvious--even if this entails that maturation is not
necessarily happening, but the facts are simply clearer
in child grammars. Thus, for instance, research that
claims children do not invoke traces in event adjuncts
strengthens the position in the literature that this is
true in the adult grammar. Theoretical arguments,
however, had scarce, non-theory-internal evidence. 16

16.
It should be obvious that this is precisely the type of
account that cannot be parametric: we do not expect some languages
to license adjunct variables in terms of traces, and some others to
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The second thing that should be clear is that a
child cannot do something that no adult does at all.
One thing is to say that the system of principles is
articulated enough to have two degrees of complexity,
and one does not go from level-l to level-2 until a
given state in the general development of the mind is
reached (the change has to come externally to the
language system). Another very different thing is to
say that the language faculty is such that at the
growing period it has (positive) properties that it
loses at the adult period. There may indeed be
properties that are of this sort; for instance, it is
not inconceivable that the phonetic system of a
babbling child is richer than that of an adult, fixed
for a given language (there may be certain sounds that
the adult 'cannot' do without retraining).
But
crucially, the adult set of properties is a sub-set of
the children's set of properties (if you wish, open
parametric options). This is completely different from
one of the examples I gave some attention to:
a
language that contains both lexical and functional
elements is obviously larger than one that contains
only lexical ones--which is a sub-set of the adult
language. Therefore, no hypothesized property of this
sort can be such that it does not show up in some form
in the adult grammar. 17 Furthermore, if the claim for
lack of (certain) functional categories is to be
explained in terms of the Theory of Markedness, it must
be that the option of having these categories is
marked.
personally, I find this unlikely--though it is
in line with claims about languages of the Asian type
lacking these elements altogether.
Any claims for 'missing links' between adults
and children, no matter how plausible, have to address
the issue of how to be incorporated into our general
theories of language and learning.
In general,
puzzling psycholinguistic evidence necessarily tells us
something either about UG or about the process of
language acquisition (assuming, of course, it doesn't
tell us anything about a faulty experiment). Here, I
have outlined some of the possible questions that the
adduced evidence may raise for UG. Assuming that the
studies in point address the issues I raised, their

license them in terms of, say, event variables.
17.
The readings of incorporated nouns may be an example of a
"child-like" property of adult grammars, if my sketchy analysis was
correct.
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consequences are potentially very important. For
instance, they would argue for the lexical/functional
distinction: further for differences in complexity
(semantic, phonological) between these: or for the
existence of a kind of parameter 'which is not
epiphenomenological (although they would not argue
against such parameters) and further is described by
the Sub-set Principle.
An important question that has to be addressed,
and according to my initial presuppositions cannot be
dealt with in this light, is: how is 'unlearning'
possible? This is particularly relevant, for the logic
of the approach forces us to take answers that in fact
explain away these issues. Thus, for instance, it has
been noted in this conference that children who do not
know that the locative argument of "put" is
subcategorized treat it like an adjunct in a wide
variety of contexts. This, presumably, is not done by
any adult grammar. Is the child then violating the
fundamental Axiom of no properties which adults lack?
In this particular example, I think not. The
child is making an assumption that is coherent with
adult grammars: given sub-categorizations, though a
function of semantic selection, are nevertheless
specific to predicates within that range. Thus, there
does not seem to be anything particularly principled
about not having a verb *"to be in hate" alongside "to
be in love", or to allow a causative alternation for
"the horse jumped" vs. "John jumped the horse" but not
for "the horse laughed" vs. *"John laughed the horse".
These matters may have to do with knowledge of the
world, and so on--but knowledge of the world has to be
learned, this time using "learn" in a strict sense.
Therefore, it should not be surprising if--and has been
noted that--children utter expressions like "John
laughed the horse" to mean "John made the horse laugh",
and furthermore if this sentence in the child grammar
had 'correct' adult grammar properties to it.
(Indeed,
the opposite case would be surprising for the latter.)
If the use of "laugh" in question gets to be dropped
when the child becomes a small adult, no 'unlearning'
of the type that troubles most of us here took place.
Simply, a possible region of the lexical map is not
encoded, and is erased from long-term memory.
In that sense, the whole process has to do with
those properties of language that I started setting
aside, arguing that linguistics has little to say about
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them. What I do not know is whether all instances of
apparent unlearning can be explained away. Otherwise,
they would be real counterexamples to the approach I
sketched here, and may in fact be used to argue for a
developmental system that has UG itself (not just
outside cognitive systems) follow a given path--of the
sort I did not know how to explore. This path would
include going from impossible adult properties to
attested ones; I am very skeptical, but I see no reason
in principle why humans shouldn't lose properties when
growing.
In any case, this would be the strongest kind
of argument for the view in question; the alternative
one (where the matter is one of gaining properties as
we grow up), can always be expressed in terms of
instantaneous learning hypotheses plus cognitive
developments which are obvious anyway.
To summarize, I have used a now traditional set
of assumptions about human grammars to constrain the
possible developmental properties of these.
If these
assumptions are correct, maturation is only possible
within the system of principles as a whole, or within
Subset-type parameters. In both instances, I have
assumed that the development in question is extralinguistic: something in the cognitive capacity of
children a time t either disallows them to have access
to a sub-set of principles, or to marked parametric
options.
In fact, the latter instance is arguably
connected to perceptual development of the sort needed
to process complex data. As for the former, it could
either be a perceptual or an internal computational
limitation. The tacit assumption in both instances is
that if the Language Acquisition Device were 'fixed'
with respect to the 'problems' in question, it would
acquire the relevant aspect of language immediately.
In a nutshell, I haven't really said anything new--but
then again I'm not sure there's anything new to say.
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